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REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT STATE OF UTAH
ARGUMENT
I. UTAH CODE ANN. SECTION 62A-4A-413 DOES NOT
DISTINGUISH BETWEEN FELONS WHO PROVIDE SERVICES TO
CHILDREN AND THOSE WHO DO NOT.
In their responsive brief, Sorensons argue that Utah Code
Ann. section 62A-4a-413 has a two-part test consisting of a
"reporting" test and a "services" test.

They argue that

subsection (1) is separate and distinct from subsection (2) in
that the State is required to check the criminal backgrounds of
several categories of individuals, but that, regardless of the
type of crime, the individuals screened can never be prohibited
from employment with a licensed youth program unless they
actually provide services to children.
The Sorensons' argument is flawed for several reasons.
Their argument is contrary to the basic principles of statutory

construction.

This Court is required to harmonize statutes so

that no provision becomes meaningless or superfluous.

Reedeker

v. Salisbury, 952 P.2d 577, 583 (Utah App. 1998); State ex rel.
A.B., 936 P.2d 1091, 1094 (Utah App. 1997).

As noted in the

State's opening brief, the statute, as a whole, becomes
meaningless if the statute is interpreted so that the only
pertinent criminal background is that of a "services provider" in
a program.

Had the legislature only intended for providers of

services to be affected, it could clearly have specified that
intent.

It is unreasonable to assume that the legislature would

require the State to screen the criminal background of every
employee, in every program, if the State's authority to take
action is limited to service providers.

Instead, the

legislature required that every individual with a close
association with a program must be screened and, if an individual
has a felony conviction, that person is prohibited from further
association with the program.
Another flaw in the Sorensons' argument is their claim that
subsection (2) sets forth "five enumerated services" that a
felon is prohibited from providing.

Subsection (2) sets forth

the types of programs and individual activities that the Office
of Licensing is responsible for licensing.

Child placing

services are done either through a program or on an individual
basis.

See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-4a-601, et seg. (Supp. 2000) .

Foster care is provided by individual families.
2

Substitute

or

institutional care is provided in group homes or institutions.
A youth program is an entity that provides a myriad of services
and functions, just as a child placing agency or a group home.
See Utah Code Ann. section 62A-2-101(20) (Supp. 2000).

It is not

an "enumerated service" as described by Sorensons in their
argument.

The Sorensons attempt to equate the specified services

provided within a program with the program itself.

A youth

program is not simply a specified service within an entity — it
is the entity being licensed.

Thus, subsection (2)'s reference

to a youth program is a reference to the entity as a whole, not
to specified services provided to children within the context of
the program.
Furthermore, the legislative intent as to the language
"provide youth programs" is even clearer in light of the State's
responsibilities.

The Office of Licensing has long been

responsible for monitoring various aspects of the programs it
licenses, not just the aspect of services to children.

Utah

Code Ann. section 62A-2-106 requires Licensing to set standards
for basic health and safety, which includes a variety of
activities not related to "direct services" to children, such as
fire and food safety, safety of the physical plant, medical
standards and procedures, emergency preparedness, etc.

It is

significant to note that the final item on the list of standards
to be set is for "consumer safety and protection."
Ann. § 62A-2-106(l) (Supp. 2000).
3

See Utah Code

Clearly, the phrase "provide

youth programs" refers to the whole program, not simply "direct
services" to children within the program.
The Sorensons' interpretation of the statute -- adopted by
the trial court --is fundamentally flawed because it imports
language into the statute that does not presently exist, such as
"direct services to children."

Furthermore, the erroneous

interpretation merges, and thereby renders meaningless, the terms
"employees" and "providers of care."

Finally it fails to

harmonize the statutory provisions so that the statute makes
sense as a whole.
II. RECENT LEGISLATIVE AMENDMENTS SUPPORT THE STATE'S
INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE.
The Sorensons argue that certain recent legislative
amendments support their interpretation of the statute that only
felons who provide direct services to children are prohibited in
a licensed program.

The Sorensons claim that the 1995

substitution of "provide" for "employed by" in section 62A-4a413(3) supports the argument that provision of services to
children is the correct meaning of "provide youth programs,"
and that "provide" is actually more restrictive than "employed
by. "
However, the amendments actually support the State's
interpretation in light of what is considered a "program" subject
to State monitoring and regulation.
106 (Supp. 2 0 00).

See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-2-

When any individual or entity "provides" a
4

youth program, as noted above it is not limited to services to
the children/consumers.

The "provision" of a youth program

involves the physical aspects of the building in which the
program exists, as well as food safety, medical and emergency
preparedness procedures, and, generally, consumer safety and
protection,

id.

Thus, "providing" a youth program is a much

broader concept than "being employed by" a youth program, and the
recent legislative amendments clarifying that language are
supportive of the State's interpretation.1
III. THE STATE'S INTERPRETATION OF THE STATUTE IS
CONSISTENT WITH STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION PRINCIPLES.
In Point III of their responsive brief, Sorensons1 argue
that the statute is unambiguous and, therefore, the State erred

1

As noted in the State's opening brief, members of a
governing body do not, by definition, provide direct services to
consumers/children in a program. See Utah Admin. Code, R501-2-3
(attached as Addendum B).
Despite that fact, the legislature
included members of a governing body as individuals for whom the
State must complete criminal history screening. Given that such
individuals were never contemplated as "direct service
providers," the legislature clearly was concerned about their
access to children in the programs, as well as their influence
over the programs as policymakers. Sorensons' statutory
interpretation is flawed because it suggests that the legislature
included the requirement to screen the criminal history of
members of a governing body knowing such screening would never be
used. Given the scope of the State's monitoring and regulation
responsibilities, members of governing boards "provide youth
programs" by setting policy, facilitating training, and ensuring
compliance with legal requirements. They do not, however,
provide direct services to children. Sorensons' interpretation
of the statute would render the governing board members' criminal
screening meaningless contrary to statutory construction
principles.
5

in providing this Court with pertinent legislative history.

The

State provided this instructive legislative history to the Court
because the sole dispute on appeal is the meaning and intent of
the statute.

Given that the parties each claim the statute is

unambiguous, while asserting contrary interpretations, it is
entirely appropriate for this Court to review legislative
history.2
In Point IV of their brief, Sorensons claim that their
statutory interpretation does not render the terms "employee" and
"provider of care" superfluous, as the State asserted in its
opening brief.
11).

(See State's Opening Brief at Point I A., pp. 8-

In response to the State's assertion that legislature would

not have included both "providers of care" and "employees" if
only one category was relevant, the Sorensons' sole argument is
that an owner or director might not submit to criminal screening
if the term "employee" is not included in the list.
2

(Appellees'

Sorensons also claim that the State Office of Licensing
has manipulated its policy/rules after this action began in order
to further its "political agenda." (Appellees' Brf. at 18-19).
They suggest that Licensing deleted "provide direct services for
children" and substituted "performs services for a licensee" in
an attempt to strengthen its argument in the courts. In fact,
the legislature enacted several new statutes shortly after this
action began which shed more light on the need for a rule change.
See Utah Code Ann. § 62A-2-101(13), -120 (1997 and Supp. 1998)
(new criminal background screening statute added which focuses on
"persons associated with a licensee" and defining those persons
as owners, directors, members of the governing body, employees,
providers of care and volunteers). It is significant to note
that the legislature focused on the "associations" with the
licensee, not the direct contact or associations with the
children in the programs.
6

Br. at 20-21).

The flaw in Sorensons' argument is that owners

and directors are already required to submit to such screening,
and do not have to be an "employee" or a "provider of care" in
order to be expected to comply with the requirement.

Other than

that one argument, the Sorensons' cannot answer the question
raised by their flawed interpretation of the statute, which is:
if the legislature intended to prohibit only felons who provide
direct services to children from association with licensed
programs, then why list both "employees" and "providers of care"
in the statute?

The reason Sorensons1 interpretation cannot

resolve the question is that the statutory provisions are only in
harmony when the State's interpretation is adopted.3

Given that

statutory provisions must be interpreted harmoniously and so that
no parts are rendered meaningless or superfluous, the trial court
erred in its statutory interpretation (adopting the Sorensons'
interpretation) which rendered the use of the separate and
distinct terms "employees" and "providers of care" meaningless.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing arguments, as well as the State's
arguments contained in its opening brief, the State respectfully
requests that this Court reverse the trial court's grant of

3

The Sorensons claim in passing that "[bjoth terms were
necessary because some employees provide services to the children
. . . but are not 'providers of care.'" This assertion has no
support in either reality or in the law.
7

summary judgment in favor of Appellees and grant judgment in
favor of the State based on the correct interpretation of section
62A-4a-413.
DATED this

day of July, 2 001.
MARK L. SHURTLEFF
Attorney General

CAROL L. C. VERDOIA
Assistant Attorney General
Attorneys for State of Utah
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

25

UTAH HUMAN SERVICES CODE

(f) one individual who represents substance abuse services licensees; and
(g) three individuals who represent clients or the general public.
(2) (a) Except as required by Subsection (2Kb), as terms of
current board members expire, the executive director
shall appoint each new member or reappointed member to
a four-year term.
(b) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection
(2)(a), the executive director shall, at the time of appointment or reappointment, adjust the length of terms to
ec-iurr *h<it the te.5jng.0f board members are staggered so
that approximately hair J : „r.j hoard is a p p o f r S e a ^ e V ^
two years.
(c) The board shall annually elect a chair from its
membership.
(3) When a vacancy occurs in the membership for any
eason, the replacement shall be appointed for the unexpired
erm.
(4) The licensing board shall meet at least quarterly, or
nore frequently as determined by the director, the chair, or
;hree or more members of the board. Five members constitute
a quorum and a vote of the majority of the members present
i n s t i t u t e s the action of the board.
(5) (a) Members shall receive no compensation or benefits
for their services, but may receive per diem and expenses
incurred in the performance of the m^mb^r's official
duties at the rates established by the Division of Finance
under Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107.
(b) Members may decline to receive per diem and
expenses for their service.
1998
62A-2-105. L i c e n s i n g board responsibilities.
(1) In accordance with Title 63, Chapter 46a, Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act, the licensing board shall review and
approve rules regarding:
(a) approving, denying, suspending, and revoking licenses for human services licensees and facilities;
(b) conditional licenses, variances from department
rule, and exclusions;
(c) the protection of the basic health and safety of
clients; and
(d) licensing of all human services licensees that are
required to be licensed under this chapter.
(2) The licensing board shall:
(a) define information that shall be submitted to the
department with an application for a license;
(b) review and approve fees, in accordance with Section
63-38-3.2. for licenses issued under this chapter;
(c) represent the community and the human services
licensees; and
(d) advise the department as requested, concerning
enforcement of rules established under this chapter. 1998
62A-2-106. Office responsibilities.
The office shall:
(1) make rules to establish:
(a) basic health and safety standards for licensees,
which shall be limited to the following:
i i) fire safety;
(ii) food safety;
(iii) sanitation;
(iv) infectious disease control;
(v) safety of the physical plant;
(vi) transportation safety;
(vii) emergency preparedness;
iviii) the administration of medical standards
and procedures, consistent with the related provisions of this title; and
(ix) consumer safety and protection;

62A-2-108

(b) minimum administration and financial requirements for licensees; and
(c) guidelines for variances from rules established
under this Subsection (1);
(2) enforce rules:
(a) approved by the licensing board;
(b) in effect on J a n u a r y 1, 1998, that apply to a
service or program for which a licensee is not under
contract with a division listed in Section 62A-1-105 to
provide until rules are established pursuant to Subsection (2)(c); and
(c) established after July 1, 1999, by a
^oji^vjnakiner board created by Section 62A-1-105
which:
(i) shall be limited to:
(A) the administration and maintenance
of client and service records;
(B) staff qualifications; and
(C) staff to client ratios; and
(ii) may only apply to a service or program for
which a licensee is not under contract with a
division listed in Section 62A-1-105 to provide;
(3) issue licenses in accordance with this chapter;
(4) conduct surveys and inspections of licensees and
facilities in accordance with Section 62A-2-118;
(5) collect licensure fees;
(6) provide necessary administrative support to the
licensing board;
(7) investigate complaints regarding any licensee or
facility;
(8) have access to all records, correspondence, and
financial data required to be maintained by a licensee or
facility;
(9) have authority to interview any client, family member of a client, employee, or officer of a human services
licensee or facility; and
(10) have authority to revoke, suspend, or extend any
license issued by the department under this chapter by
following the procedures and requirements of Title 63.
Chapter 46b, Administrative Procedures Act.
1999
62A-2-106.1,62A-2-107.

Repealed.

1998

62A-2-108. L i c e n s u r e r e q u i r e m e n t s — Expiration —
Renewal.
(1) Except as provided in Section 62A-2-110, no person,
agency, firm, corporation, association, or governmental unit,
acting severally or jointly with any other person, agency, firm,
corporation, association, or governmental unit, may establish,
conduct, or maintain a human services program or facility in
this state without a valid and current license issued by and
under the authority of the department as provided by this
chapter and the rules of the licensing board.
(2) No license issued under this chapter is assignable or
transferable.
(3) A current license shall at all times be posted in each
human services program or facility, in a place that is visible
and readily accessible to the public.
(4) (a) Each license issued under this chapter expires at
midnight 12 months from the date of issuance unless it
has been:
(i) previously revoked by the office: or
(ii) voluntarily returned to the office by the human
services licensee.
(b) A license shall be renewed upon application and
payment of the applicable fee, unless the office finds that
the licensee or facility has not complied with the provisions of or rules made under this chapter.
(5) Any licensee or facility which is in operation at the time
rules are made in accordance with this chapter shall be given
a reasonable time for compliance as determined by the rule.
1998

ADDENDUM B

R501-2-3. Governance.
A. The program shall have a governing body which is responsible and has authority over the
policies, training and monitoring of staff and consumer activities for all phases of the program.
Their responsibilities shall include the following:
1. to ensure program policy and procedures compliance,
2. to ensure continual compliance with relevant local, state and federal requirements,
3. to notify the Office within 30 days of changes in program administration and purpose,
according to R501-2-2.
4. to ensure that the program is fiscally and operationally sound,
5. to ensure that the program has adequate staffing as identified on the organizational chart,
6. to ensure that the program has general liability insurance, professional liability insurance
as appropriate, vehicle insurance for transport of consumers, and fire insurance, and
7. for programs serving youth, the program director oi designee shall meet with the
Superintendent or designee of the local school district at the time of initial licensure, and then
again each year as the programs renews it's license to complete the necessary student forms
including youth education forms.
B. The governing body shall be:
1. a Board of Directors in a non-profit organization; or
2. commissioners or appointed officials of a governmental unit; or
3. Board of Directors or individual owner or owners of a for-profit organization, and
4. for Child Placing Adoption Agencies, a Board of Directors. The Board members shall not
be owners, employees, or paid consultants of the agency.
C. The program shall have a list of members of the governing body, indicating name, address
and term of membership.
D. The program shall have an organization chart which identifies operating units of the
program and their inter-relationships. The chart shall define lines of authority and responsibility
for all program staff.
E. When the governing body is composed of more than one person, the governing body shall
establish written by-laws, and shall hold formal meetings at least twice a year, Child Placing
Agencies must meet at least quarterly, maintain written minutes, which shall be available for
review by the Office, to include the following:
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1. attendance,
2. date,
3. agenda items, and
4. actions.
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